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A RBITRATION I NNUMERACY

Christopher R. Drahozal*

Innumeracy, an inability to deal comfortably with the fundamental
notions of number and chance, plagues far too many otherwise
knowledgeable citizens.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Both sides in the public policy debate over consumer and employment arbitration have
recognized the importance of empirical research to making sound policy.2 Even Public Citizen, a
vocal critic of consumer arbitration, has stated that it “agree[s]” that “congressional scrutiny of
arbitration ‘can be dangerous if the terms of the debate focus too much on anecdote and too little
on systematic study.’”3 According to Professor Peter B. Rutledge, “it now appears to be common
ground that the policy debate over the Arbitration Fairness Act should focus on empirical data.”4

*

John M. Rounds Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, University of
Kansas School of Law. This article is adapted from my written statement to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee for
its hearing on Arbitration: Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing on S. 931 Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 112th Cong.
13 (2011) [hereinafter Hearings], available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-10-13DrahozalTestimony.pdf.
1
JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3-4 (2001). With the
exception of the quote from First Lady Michelle Obama, see infra text accompanying note 61, the quotes that begin
each part of this article are either from Paulos’s book or from MICHAEL BLASTLAND & ANDREW DILNOT, THE NUMBERS
GAME: THE COMMONSENSE GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING NUMBERS IN THE NEWS, IN POLITICS, AND IN LIFE (2009).
Blastland and Dilnot originated the BBC radio program “More or Less,” which “explains — and sometimes debunks —
the numbers and statistics used in political debate, the news and everyday life.” See BBC, More or Less,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006qshd (last visited Jan. 25, 2012); and BBC, About More or Less,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/more_or_less/1628489.stm (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
2
Given the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), that debate
is likely to move even more firmly into the legislative and regulatory arenas. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of
2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 2(3) (2011); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. § 1028(a) (2010) (requiring the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to study pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in consumer financial services contracts). Courts likely will continue to play a role in regulating consumer and
employment arbitration agreements, as other papers in this symposium have demonstrated, but that role will be a
reduced one after Concepcion.
3
PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP: HOW OPPONENTS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY DISTORT
THE DEBATE ON ARBITRATION 2 (2008) (quoting Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 549,
589 (2008)), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationDebateTrap(Final).pdf.
4
Peter B. Rutledge, The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 4; see also
Peter B. Rutledge, Common Ground in the Arbitration Debate, 1 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 1, 8 (2009) (“[T]here now
appears to be a consensus that the future of arbitration should be decided by data, not anecdote.”) (emphasis omitted).

89

If so, that is an important and valuable development. Anecdotes alone do not provide a solid
basis for legislative or regulatory action.
But of course one must be cautious in evaluating empirical data. Even the best empirical
studies have limits or are subject to qualifications. And numbers can be misleading if
misinterpreted. As Michael Blastland and Andrew Dilnot have written: “[Numbers] can
bamboozle not enlighten, terrorize not guide, and all too easily end up abused and distrusted.”5
So empirical studies must be used thoughtfully as a basis for making policy, recognizing both
their value and their limitations.
Arbitration innumeracy, as I use the phrase here, is the “inability to deal comfortably with
the fundamental notions of number and chance” in evaluating arbitration, particularly consumer
and employment arbitration. This article discusses a number of examples of possible arbitration
innumeracy — cases in which statistics about arbitration are incomplete or outdated,
misunderstood or misused. In particular, it examines empirical studies on:







The use of arbitration clauses in credit card agreements;
Outcomes in consumer arbitration;
Arbitrator selection by the National Arbitration Forum;
Class arbitration waivers in consumer arbitration clauses;
The incentives of arbitrators and repeat-player bias; and
Unintended consequences of restrictions on consumer and employment
arbitration clauses.

Each of these topics illustrates a different issue of arbitration innumeracy, ranging from samples
that are not representative of the population as a whole to comparisons that do not compare like
cases. The sections of this Article put the issue in more complete empirical context and discuss
briefly how the arbitration innumeracy impacts the policy debate over consumer and employment
arbitration.

5

BLASTLAND & DILNOT, supra note 1, at x-xi.
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II.

“W H A T T O C O U N T ”: T H E U S E O F A R B I T R A T I O N C L A U S E S I N C R E D I T
CARD AGREEMENTS
It is, for a start, a fundamental of almost any statistic that, in order to
produce it, something somewhere has been defined and identified.
Never underestimate how much nuisance that small practical detail can
cause.6

A central theme in criticisms of consumer arbitration is that consumers do not have any
choice if they want to avoid arbitration.7 But how to measure the extent of consumer choice —
i.e., what to count?
Credit card agreements are commonly cited as a type of contract as to which consumers
have no choice but to agree to arbitration.8 Thus, commentators have asserted both that “[i]n the
fine print [of credit card agreements], almost always, is an arbitration clause”9 and that “[n]early
every credit card issuer includes an arbitration agreement in [its] ... contracts with cardholders.”10
In fact, those are not the same thing — the number of credit card agreements is very different
from the number of credit card issuers — and neither assertion, at present, is accurate.

6

Id., at 5. Blastland and Dilnot focus on the difficulty of classifying things before counting them. Id. I
recognize that difficulty, but am concerned here with the preliminary question of what should be counted at all.
7
E.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong., § 2(3) (2011).
8
Other studies of the use of arbitration clauses in consumer contacts include Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R.
Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004) (“Across the industries studied, fifty-seven of the 161 sampled businesses
(35.4%) included arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts.”); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Unfair Dispute
Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 50
(Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) (finding that only 6.0% of software license agreements studied included arbitration
clauses, although noting that some of the contracts studied were commercial rather than consumer contracts); and
Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 tbl.2 (2008) (finding that
20 of 26, or 76.9%, of sample of consumer contracts included arbitration clauses; sample included consumer financial
services and telecommunications contracts).
9
Yuki Noguchi, Credit Card Arbitration Trumps Lawsuits, Court Says, NPR, Jan. 11, 2012,
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/11/144990644/credit-card-arbitration-trumps-lawsuits-court-says; see also PUBLIC
CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION: UNFAIR AND EVERYWHERE 3 (Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf (reporting that “the use of forced arbitration remains
rampant,” citing credit card agreements as an example); see also Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using
Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 747 (2009) (“A binding arbitration clause is a
staple of credit card agreements....”).
10
Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card Industry Using It to Quash Legal Claims?: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1-2 (2009) (statement of
Congressman Cohen), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-39_49475.PDF; see also
Memo to Elizabeth Warren: How to Protect Consumers, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2010 (quoting David Arkush, director,
Public Citizen’s Congress Watch division), http://blogs.reuters.com/reuters-wealth/2010/09/17/memo-to-elizabethwarren-how-to-protect-consumers (“Nearly every consumer lender puts a clause in the standard-form contract saying
that the consumer can never sue the company, for anything.”).

91

It has never been the case that “[n]early every credit card issuer” used arbitration clauses.
As of December 31, 2009, over 80 percent (247 of 298, or 82.9%) of credit card issuers did not
use arbitration clauses in their cardholder agreements.11 Many, but not all, of those issuers were
credit unions that offered credit cards to their members. Barely 17 percent (51 of 298, or 17.1%)
of issuers used arbitration clauses in their credit card agreements.12
The reason for the perception that consumers have limited choice as to credit cards is that
until recently almost all of the very large credit card issuers used arbitration clauses. But even
that has changed. As of December 31, 2009, just over 95 percent of credit card loans outstanding
were by issuers that used arbitration clauses in their cardholder agreements.13 One year later, as
of December 31, 2010, that percentage had declined to 48 percent.14 The most recent data thus
suggest that consumers have a much larger degree of choice (and, indeed, always have had a
much larger degree of choice) than commonly perceived. And the extent of that choice depends
very much on what is counted: credit cards or credit card issuers.

III.

“I S T H A T A B I G N U M B E R ?”: O U T C O M E S I N C O N S U M E R A R B I T R A T I O N
The best prompt to thinking is to ask the question that at least checks
our presumptions, simple-headed though it may sound: “Is that a big
number?”15

Critics of consumer arbitration have cited what they see as excessively high win rates for
businesses as evidence that arbitration is unfair to consumers. For example, a letter in support of
the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, signed by over eighty professors of
Banking and Consumer Law, stated that “[s]tudies have found the arbitrators find for companies

11

The Credit CARD Act of 2009 required credit card issuers to supply their credit card agreements to the Federal
Reserve, which in turn was to make them available to the public via the Federal Reserve web page. See Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, §204(a), 123 Stat. 1734, 1746-47 (May
22, 2009) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d)(3) (2012)). The data described in the text were collected from credit card
agreements available on the Federal Reserve web page. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau now maintains the
database of credit card agreements on its web site. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Credit Card Agreement
Database, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/agreements/ (last visited May 25, 2012).
12
See Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements: An
Empirical Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. ___ (forthcoming 2012).
13
See id. at ___. Credit card loans outstanding are not the same as the number of credit card accounts, but the
two are highly correlated, and better data is available on credit card loans outstanding.
14
Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming).
Most of the decline appears to be due to two factors: (1) the decision of the National Arbitration Forum to cease
administering new consumer arbitrations in settlement of the Minnesota Attorney General’s consumer fraud suit against
the NAF; and (2) the decision of four large issuers to settle an antitrust suit against them by agreeing to remove
arbitration clauses from their cardholder agreements for three-and-one-half years. Id. at __. Whether those issuers will
resume use of arbitration clauses after that period expires is unknown.
15
BLASTLAND & DILNOT, supra note 1, at 30.
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against consumers 94 to 96% of the time, suggesting that arbitration providers are responding to
the incentive to find for those who select them: the companies that insert their names in their form
contracts.”16 While I applaud the letter’s reliance on data rather than anecdotes, the conclusion it
draws from that data is incorrect.
A win rate of 94 to 96 percent sounds really high. Surely a forum that rules in favor of
businesses such a high percentage of the time must be biased — or at least that seems to be the
intuition underlying statements such as the one cited above. But while 94 to 96 percent sounds
high, we still need to ask the question: “Is that a big number?” And to answer that question we
need to ask further: “as compared to what?”
Evaluating whether a win rate is too high (or too low) cannot be done in the abstract. It
must be based on a comparison to a base line — or, in other words, you need to have a control
group. The obvious control group to use here is courts: outcomes in arbitration cases need to be
compared to outcomes in comparable cases in court in order to draw any conclusions about how
consumers fare.17 This is easier said than done, of course. It is hard to control for differences
across types of cases. Important differences, such as the legal and factual strength of the case, are
difficult to observe. That said, there is one type of case in which the characteristics of the cases
seem likely to be at least roughly comparable in arbitration and in court: debt collection cases
brought by businesses — which happens to be the exact type of case cited by the critics as
showing a high business win rate in arbitration.18
So how do consumers fare in debt collection cases? In arbitration, as the data cited above
suggest, businesses win the vast majority of the cases. The Searle study, for example, found that
“[c]reditors won some relief in 86.2 percent of the individual AAA debt collection arbitrations
and 97.1 percent of the AAA debt collection program arbitrations that went to an award.”19 But
the study found that creditors won some relief at an even higher rate (ranging from 98.4 percent
to 100.0 percent of the cases) in debt collection cases in court.20 Likewise, while prevailing
creditors were awarded from 92.9 percent to 99.2 percent of the amount sought in AAA

16

E.g., Letter from Professors of Consumer Law and Banking Law to Senators Dodd and Shelby and
Congressmen Frank and Bachus, Statement in Support of Legislation Creating a Consumer Financial Protection
Agency 6 (Sept. 29, 2009), http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Media/consumer-law%209-28-09.pdf. (citing PUBLIC CITIZEN,
THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007),
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7545; Simone Baribeau, Consumer Advocates Slam Credit-Card
Arbitration, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 16, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0716/p13s01-wmgn.html).
17
E.g., Memorandum from William N. Lund, Superintendent, Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection,
Department of Professional and Financial Regulation on Report to Committee: Compilation of Information Reported
by Consumer Arbitration Providers to Senator Peter Bowman, Senate Chair; Representative Sharon Anglin Treat,
House Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on Insurance and Financial Services 7 (Apr. 1, 2009),
http://www.maine.gov/pfr/consumercredit/documents/ArbitrationProvidersReport.rtf (“[A]lthough credit card banks or
assignees prevail in most arbitrations, this fact alone does not necessarily indicate unfairness to consumers. The fact is
that the primary alternative to arbitration (a civil action in court) also commonly results in judgment for the plaintiff.”).
18
See PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 16, at 5.
19
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in Court, 7 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 77, 80 (2011).
20
See id.
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arbitrations, they were awarded from 96.2 percent to 99.5 percent of the amount sought in debt
collection cases in court.21
I certainly do not claim that these data show that arbitration is better for consumers than
litigation. But likewise the data provide no support for the view that consumers fare worse in
arbitration than they do in comparable cases in court.22 And the data show definitively that high
business win rates in arbitration do not in and of themselves prove that arbitration is unfair to
consumers. For the types of cases studied, a win rate of 94 to 96 percent is not big enough to
suggest that arbitrators are biased in favor of businesses.

IV.

“I S T H E C O M P A R I S O N O F L I K E W I T H L I K E ?”: A R B I T R A T O R S E L E C T I O N
AND THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM
[P]olitics has precisely that bad habit of ... overlooking definitional
differences. To detect this, the principle to keep in mind is one
everyone knows, but has grown stale with overuse. It is true and
relevant as ever, ... and it is this: is the comparison of like with like?23

The poster child for all that is seen as wrong with consumer arbitration is the National
Arbitration Forum. Although the criticisms of the NAF are multiple,24 here I address only the
striking finding by Public Citizen that the twenty-eight arbitrators appointed most often by the
National Arbitration Forum (the “Top 28 NAF arbitrators”) ruled in favor of businesses at a much
higher rate than other NAF arbitrators.25 The Top 28 NAF arbitrators, Public Citizen reported,
handled 89.5% of NAF’s cases and ruled in favor of the business in those cases 95% of the time.
By comparison, the next 120 arbitrators handled only 10% of the cases, and ruled in favor of
businesses only 86% of the time.26 According to Public Citizen, this finding shows that “the
busiest arbitrators produce the results corporations seek.”27 The implication of Public Citizen’s

21

See id. at 80-81. Controlling for confounding factors using multiple regression analysis did not change the
results. See id. at 98-101.
22
For evidence on comparative outcomes in employment cases in arbitration and court, see, e.g., Theodore
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DISP. RESOL.
J., Nov.2003-Jan. 2004, at 44, 53 (“The results are consistent with arbitrators, at least those participating in AAAsponsored arbitration, not acting in a materially different fashion than in-court adjudicators.”). However, it is much
more difficult to be confident that the cases being compared are actually comparable in the employment setting than in
the debt collection setting.
23
BLASTLAND & DILNOT, supra note 1, at 162.
24
See, e.g., Complaint, Minnesota v. National Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18559 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
July 14, 2009), available at www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/PressReleases/SignedFiledComplaintArbitrationCompany.pdf.
25
See PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 16, at 2.
26
See id. at 15.
27
Id. at 2 (capitalization and boldtype omitted).
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finding, according to Paul Bland, is that the NAF was “steering a vast majority of cases to a
handful of people for reliable votes.”28
But comparing outcomes in the cases decided by the Top 28 NAF arbitrators with
outcomes in other NAF arbitrations is not “the comparison of like with like.”29 Public Citizen’s
finding disregards an important difference between the cases: the Top 28 NAF arbitrators
apparently decided almost exclusively cases in which the consumer failed to appear (at least
based on the NAF’s classification of those cases), while the remaining NAF arbitrators only
rarely decided default cases. Law Professor David Sorkin, who served as an NAF arbitrator,
suggested this possibility at a Roundtable on debt collection litigation and arbitration conducted
by the FTC:
I have handled about ... 60 collection cases for National Arbitration
Forum over about eight years. I didn’t get any of the default cases. My
understanding is that the forum will send out default cases in bulk to an
arbitrator, and an arbitrator might get a stack of 50 or 100 or 200 cases,
all of which had very similar files with no response by the
respondent/consumer, and those cases probably went to a very small
number of arbitrators consistent with the experience in California ....30

An examination of the data used by Public Citizen confirms this understanding.31 Of the
16,330 cases that were decided by the Top 28 NAF arbitrators (and not settled or dismissed),
15,890, or 97.3% were classified by the NAF as default cases — i.e., cases in which the consumer
did not show up. By comparison, only 166 of the 1745 cases (or 9.5%) decided by the remaining
NAF arbitrators were default cases. The Top 28 NAF arbitrators decided 99.0% of all default
cases administered by the NAF.
It is not surprising, then, that the win rate for businesses in cases decided by the Top 28
NAF arbitrators is higher than the win rate for businesses in cases decided by the remaining NAF
arbitrators. Parties tend to do less well when they default than when they show up and defend
themselves.32 That is true both in arbitrations administered by providers other than the NAF as
well as cases in court.33
When like cases are compared to like, the disparity between the two groups of arbitrators
looks very different, as can be seen in Table 1. In default cases, the Top 28 NAF arbitrators ruled

28

Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and Arbitration: A
Roundtable Discussion, transcript at 59 (Aug. 6, 2009) [hereinafter FTC Roundtable] (remarks of Paul Bland),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/debtcollectround/090805-CHIL/transcript-90806.pdf.
29
For an alternative analysis of the NAF data, see Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on
Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009).
30
FTC Roundtable, supra note 28, at 71-72 (statement of David Sorkin).
31
See PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAF CALIFORNIA DATA,
http://www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/arbitration/NAFCalifornia.xls (last visited May 21, 2012). The calculations in
the text are by the author.
32
See infra Table 1. Alternatively, some consumers might default because they believe they are likely would
lose even if they show up, either because of some belief about arbitration or because they know they have a weak case.
33
See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 19, at 91.
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overwhelmingly in favor of businesses. But so did the other NAF arbitrators, albeit addressing a
much, much smaller number of cases. And in cases decided after a hearing, the Top 28 NAF
arbitrators actually ruled in favor of consumers slightly more often than the other NAF
arbitrators, although the difference is not statistically significant.

Table 1. Outcomes in National Arbitration Forum Arbitrations
(California data, Jan. 2003-Mar. 2007)34

Cases Decided on Default
Business prevailed
Consumer prevailed
Total
Cases Decided After
Hearing
Business prevailed
Consumer prevailed
Total
Total Cases

Top 28 NAF
Arbitrators

All Other NAF
Arbitrators

Total

15,889
(100.0%)
1
(0.0%)
15,890

165
(99.4%)
1
(0.6%)
166

16,054

432
(98.2%)
8
(1.8%)
440
16,330

1559
(98.7%)
20
(1.3%)
1579
1745

1991

2
16,056

28
2019
18,075

To be clear, I am not defending the NAF from any of the other claims of wrongdoing to
which it has been subjected. And, of course, these data do not answer the question of why the
NAF sent almost all of its default cases to the same group of arbitrators. Perhaps it was because
those arbitrators more reliably ruled in favor of the business, or perhaps it was for another
reason.35 My point is a narrower one: that to attempt to answer that question statistically requires
one to compare like cases to like, and Public Citizen did not do so.

34

See PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 16, at 15. This table does not include cases classified by
the NAF as “dismissed” (772 cases), “settled” (422 cases), or resolved by “award by settlement” (25).
35
The data might support a different “steering” explanation — that the NAF sent default cases to one group of
arbitrators because they ruled more reliably in favor of businesses in that type of case, and contested cases to a different
group of arbitrators because they ruled more reliably in favor of businesses in that type of case. But the differences
between the groups are not statistically significant.
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V.

A R E T H O S E C O U N T E D R E P R E S E N T A T I V E O F T H E R E S T ?: A R B I T R A T I O N
CLAUSES AND CLASS ARBITRATION WAIVERS
This is the sample, the essence of a million statistics, like the poet’s
drop of water containing an image of the world in miniature — we
hope. It is wonderful, when it works. But if the few that are counted
don’t mirror the others, the whole endeavor fails. So which few?
Choose badly and the sample is skewed, the mirror flawed, and for a
great many of the basic facts about us,... all that is multiplied is the size
of the error.36

An important and as yet unanswered question is the effect of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion37 on the use of arbitration clauses. It is too soon
after the decision in Concepcion to be able to evaluate empirically its effects, but some inferences
can be drawn from existing empirical studies — to the extent the samples in those studies are
“representative of the rest.”
First, prior to Concepcion, not all consumer arbitration clauses included class arbitration
waivers, suggesting that businesses use arbitration clauses for reasons other than only avoiding
class actions.38 Studies finding widespread use of class arbitration waivers prior to Concepcion
focused on mass contracting businesses such as credit card issuers and telecommunications
companies.39 But the use of class arbitration waivers varied by widely by type of business, and
many consumer arbitration agreements did not include class arbitration waivers at all. The Searle
study found that of the arbitration clauses giving rise to AAA consumer arbitrations during the
time period studied, only 36.5 percent (109 of 299) included class arbitration waivers.40 All of
the cell phone contracts included class arbitration waivers, as did all of the credit card contracts.
But none of the insurance contracts and none of the real estate brokerage agreements included
class arbitration waivers. And somewhat over half of the car sale contracts (53.1%) and home
builder contracts (64.7%) included class arbitration waivers.41 Studying only credit card or cell
phone contracts can provide important information about those types of contracts, but in this case
generalizing from those types of contracts to consumer contracts as a whole is not appropriate.
Second, even after Concepcion, it is unlikely that all consumer contracts — or even all
credit card contracts, which ordinarily include class arbitration waivers when they include

36

BLASTLAND & DILNOT, supra note 1, at 111-12.
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
38
See Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (and not Use) Arbitration Clauses?,
25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 470-74 (2010).
39
E.g., Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin, supra note 8, at 891-92.
40
See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration, 79 TENN. L.
REV. 289, 349 (2012).
41
Id. One implication of this data is that making all consumer arbitration clauses unenforceable because of
concerns about the availability of class relief would be overbroad. See Christopher Drahozal, Concepcion and the
Arbitration Fairness Act, SCOTUSBLOG, Sep. 13, 2011, http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/concepcion-and-thearbitration-fairness-act/.
37
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arbitration clauses — will begin using arbitration clauses. As Professor Rutledge and I conclude
in a forthcoming paper:
Our finding that issuers are less likely to use arbitration clauses when
located in states that (prior to Concepcion) had held class arbitration
waivers unenforceable suggests that the use of arbitration clauses will
increase as a result of Concepcion. But the significance of other
variables in the model (the riskiness of the credit card portfolio, the
degree of specialization in credit card loans, the size of the issuer, and
the issuer’s organizational form) suggests that not all credit card issuers
are likely to use arbitration clauses following the decision in
Concepcion.42

To illustrate the point: very few credit card issuers (5 of 97, or 5.2%) located in states that
had held class arbitration waivers unenforceable prior to Concepcion used arbitration clauses.
But even in states that had held class arbitration waivers enforceable prior to Concepcion, only a
minority of credit card issuers (23 of 103, or 22.3%) used arbitration clauses.43 That percentage
likely will increase after Concepcion. But given the other factors that seem to explain the use of
arbitration clauses by credit card issuers, these data suggest that the use of arbitration clauses will
not become ubiquitous after Concepcion, even in the credit card industry.44 Central to this
finding is the fact, described earlier, that the substantial majority of credit card issuers do not
include arbitration clauses in their credit card agreements. A sample consisting only of large
credit card issuers, almost all of which until recently used arbitration clauses in their credit card
agreements, would not have been representative of credit card issuers as a whole.

VI.

CORRELATION DOES NOT PROVE CAUSATION: INCENTIVES OF
A R B I T R A T O R S A N D R E P E A T -P L A Y E R B I A S
Correlation and causation are two quite different words, and the
innumerate are more prone to mistake them than most. Quite often,
two quantities are correlated without either one being the cause of the
other.45

42

Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 12, at ___.
Id. at ___.
44
As discussed previously, see supra text accompanying notes 8-10, an important question here is what to count:
is the relevant measure the number of credit cards (or dollar value of credit card loans) or the number of credit card
issuers?
45
PAULOS, supra note 1, at 159.
43
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This is the oldest fallacy in the book, that correlation proves causation,
and also the most obdurate.... Do not rest on the first culprit, the
explanation nearest at hand or most in mind.... Keep the instinct for
causation restless in its search for explanations and it will serve you
well.46

A common concern about outcomes in arbitration is that the structure of the arbitration
process results in decisions that are biased in favor of businesses. Because arbitrators get paid
only when they are selected to serve, rather than being paid salaries like judges are, critics assert
that arbitrators will tend to favor “repeat players” — parties that will likely appear in arbitration
on multiple occasions and so have more opportunities to appoint arbitrators than non-repeat
players.
The evidence on whether repeat players have a higher success rate in arbitration is mixed.
Business claimants do have a higher win rate in arbitration than consumer claimants, but that is
likely due to the different types of claims businesses assert.47 The usual test for the existence of a
repeat-player effect has been to compare win rates for repeat businesses in arbitration to win rates
for non-repeat businesses in arbitration.48 The Searle study, for example, found that under this
usual approach, repeat businesses had a slightly higher win rate against consumers than nonrepeat businesses, but that the difference was not statistically significant. Under an alternative
definition of repeat business, the study found a greater repeat-player effect, albeit even then one
that was only weakly statistically significant.49 Other studies, usually of AAA employment
arbitrations, also have found that repeat businesses have a higher win rate in arbitration than nonrepeat businesses.50
But bias is not the only, or even the most likely, explanation for such a repeat-player
effect. Correlation is not causation. We must keep our “instinct for causation restless in its
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BLASTLAND & DILNOT, supra note 1, at 182-83.
For example, the Searle study found that consumer claimants won some relief in 53.3 percent of the AAA
consumer arbitrations studied, and that, in those cases, consumers were awarded 52.1 percent of the amount they
sought. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitration, 25 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 897-99 (2010). By comparison, business claimants won some relief in 83.6% of the AAA
arbitrations studied, and in those cases recovered 93.0% of the amount sought. Id. at 898-99. The reason for the
difference, as stated in the study, is not that arbitration is biased in favor of businesses but rather that businesses bring
different types of claims than consumers. Id. at 901 (“Business claimants usually bring claims for specific monetary
amounts representing debts for goods provided or services rendered. Many of the cases are resolved ex parte, with the
consumer failing to appear. By comparison, cases with consumer claimants are much less likely to involve liquidated
amounts and more likely to be contested by businesses.”).
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E.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189,
189-90 (1997). An alternative test would be to compare win rates for repeat businesses in arbitration to win rates for
repeat businesses in court.
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Drahozal & Zyontz, AAA Consumer Arbitration, supra note 47, at 909-11.
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Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 48, at 213; Lisa B. Bingham,
Unequal Bargaining Power: An Alternative Account for the Repeat Player Effect in Employment Arbitration, IRRA
50TH ANN. PROC. 33, 38-39 (1998); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics
in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 223 (1998); Alexander J.S. Colvin,
An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-16 (2011).
47

99

search for explanations.”51 An alternative explanation for the higher win rate of repeat businesses
is that repeat businesses are likely to be more sophisticated at screening cases and settling
disputes than non-repeat businesses. As such, one would expect them be more likely than nonrepeat businesses to settle the strong claims against them and arbitrate only the weak claims. If
so, one would expect to find exactly the pattern described above: that repeat businesses have
higher win rates than non-repeat businesses. One implication of this alternative theory is that
repeat businesses will likely settle cases at a higher rate than non-repeat businesses. And that is
exactly what the Searle study found: “that repeat businesses are more likely to settle or otherwise
close cases before an award than non-repeat businesses.”52 Accordingly, the study concludes,
“the repeat-player effect is more likely due to case screening by repeat businesses than arbitrator
(or other) bias.”53
It may be that there is some other explanation for the higher settlement rate for repeat
businesses than non-repeat businesses — that correlation is not causation in that context either.
But at present, at least, the available empirical evidence suggests that arbitrator bias is not the
cause of higher win rates for repeat businesses.

VII. T R A D E O F F S : U N I N T E N D E D C O N S E Q U E N C E S

OF RESTRICTIONS ON
CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION CLAUSES

There is no such thing as a free lunch, and even if there were, there’d
be no guarantee against indigestion.54

After teaching contract law for seventeen years, it is clear to me that when parties face
restrictions on one type of contract term, such as an arbitration clause, they often respond by
changing other terms of their contract. And, in some cases, they might even respond by refusing
to enter into a contract altogether. The obvious benefits of a restriction for one group may turn
into hidden costs for another. Too often decision makers do not consider these sorts of tradeoffs,
or unintended consequences, in evaluating the costs and benefits of proposed laws. There is no
such thing as a free lunch — that is, all regulations have costs that offset, at least in part, their
benefits.
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BLASTLAND & DILNOT, supra note 1, at 182-83.
Drahozal & Zyontz, AAA Consumer Arbitration, supra note 47, at 913.
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Id. at 916. Lisa Bingham likewise concludes that the repeat-player effect in her studies was likely due, not to
bias, but rather to better case screening by businesses. Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration
Before and After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of
Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
RD
THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53 ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303, 323
tbl.2 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds. 2004).
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PAULOS, supra note 1, at 147. The phrase “there is no such thing as a free lunch” also is used to refer to the
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Several such unintended consequences might result from restrictions on the use of predispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts.
First, consumers and employees without disputes — who have no complaint with their
treatment by a business — likely will be made worse off by legal restrictions on the use of
arbitration. The cost savings that businesses achieve through arbitration benefit consumers by
enabling the businesses to reduce prices and employers to increase wages.55 Removing those cost
savings by restricting the use of arbitration will have the opposite effect. The effect is likely to be
particularly pronounced for those least able to afford it. For example, the consumers most likely
to be affected by restrictions on the use of arbitration clauses in credit card agreements are those
with low credit ratings who have few alternative sources of credit. A statistical examination of
the factors explaining the use of arbitration clauses by credit card issuers finds a strong
correlation between the riskiness of the issuer’s credit card portfolio and its use of arbitration
clauses.56 If credit card issuers can no longer include arbitration clauses in their cardholder
agreements, they may become less willing to lend to those higher risk consumers.
Second, restrictions on the enforceability of arbitration agreements may reduce rather
than enhance the ability of some consumers and employees to have their claims heard. The
available empirical evidence suggests that for relatively low-dollar claims, arbitration may be a
more accessible forum than court.57 Employment lawyer Lewis Maltby makes the point in the
context of employment arbitration: “[M]ost employees will not be able to secure their employer’s
agreement to arbitrate once a dispute arises. The vast majority of employment disputes, however,
do not involve enough damages to support contingent fee litigation. Therefore, outlawing predispute agreements to arbitrate will leave many employees with no access to justice.”58
Finally, some consumers will be less able to have their cases actually heard if the
availability of arbitration is restricted. Very few court cases actually make it trial. Indeed, in
2009, only 1.2 percent of federal court dispositions were by either jury trial or bench trial.59 Most
court cases are resolved instead by dispositive motions or settlement. Consumers who bring
those cases never have a “day in court” to tell their story to a judge or jury. By comparison, the
Searle study found that over 50 percent of consumer claims in AAA arbitrations made it to a
hearing before an arbitrator, and over 30 percent were resolved by the issuance of an award after
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See Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements – with Particular
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 254-57 (2006).
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See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 12, at ___. Again, correlation is not causation. It may be, for example,
that risk-taking consumers tend to prefer credit card agreements with arbitration clauses. That explanation seems
unlikely, however.
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See Eisenberg & Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims, supra note 22, at 53.
58
Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employment
Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 314 (2003).
59
See ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES tbl.4.10 (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2009/Table410.pdf.
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a hearing.60 To the extent there is value in consumers actually being able to present their claim to
a neutral decision maker, restricting the availability of arbitration will deprive consumers of that
value.

VIII. C O N C L U S I O N S
I’m a lawyer because I was bad at [math and science]. All lawyers in
the room, you know it’s true. We can’t add and subtract, so we argue.61

First Lady Michelle Obama’s assertion, at a recent National Science Foundation event,
reflects a popularly held view that lawyers are not good at math. Perhaps that explains some of
the prevalence of arbitration innumeracy.62 But avoiding arbitration innumeracy does not require
sophisticated math skills. For consumers of empirical data, avoiding arbitration innumeracy
requires a sensitivity to basic statistical concepts and a willingness to look skeptically at empirical
research, even when it confirms one’s previously held views. For producers of empirical data,
avoiding arbitration innumeracy requires a willingness to apply proper empirical techniques and,
importantly, to recognize the limitations of one’s data. As empirical data becomes ever more
important to the intensifying debate over consumer and employment arbitration, avoiding
arbitration innumeracy is essential to making sound public policy.
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Drahozal & Zyontz, AAA Consumer Arbitration, supra note 47, at 881 fig.5. Of the hearings in the consumer
cases studied, 62.1% were either in person or by telephone; the remaining cases involved document-only hearings. Id.
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A more cynical explanation would be that arbitration innumeracy sometimes might result not from ignorance
but rather from knowing attempts to misuse the empirical record. I have no way to know whether that in fact is the
case.
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